I would like to pursue this issue of facts a little more, but it seems to me better to start a new topic for this purpose. If our distinguished moderator would prefer to have this on the existing topic, I will repost it there.
Michael Erlewine wrote: "And the mind can be said to surround the facts like the sugar solution surrounds and precipitates sugar crystals. Beyond the plain facts is the solution out of which or from which the facts eventually emerge and are awarded ‘facticity’ by scientific consensus."
Michael, I admire your gift for metaphor. In my somewhat more stilted language, I would say that facts are “hypostases” (precipitates or sediments) “emanating” from certain hypotheses. (My apologies to Plotinus.)
Continuing in my stilted vein, the reality of such facts—that is, their “thingness”—takes its meaning solely from the hypotheses posited to account for them.
In one of his books, Heidegger mentions the story of Galileo’s famous experiment where he dropped a heavy and light ball from the leaning tower of Pisa to determine if they would fall at the same rate (his view) or whether the heavier ball would fall faster (the Aristotelean view). It may not have been Galileo who actually did this, but that does not affect the moral of the story. The heavier body fell just a little bit faster. The Aristoteleans said “See, I told you so”. The Galileans said “See, I told you so. The heavy ball fell just a little bit faster because the air resistance was greater on the lighter ball. In a vacuum, they would fall at exactly the same rate”. The latter experiment was of course performed and gave the result Galileo would have predicted. No doubt some enterprising Aristotlean would have argued that the fall of the two bodies in a vacuum was the exceptional and not the normative case, and could have come up with some explanation within the framework of Aristotelean physics to justify that exception.
Here we have two different views of the same event. The interpretation depends on certain hypotheses held by the observers. The facticity of the event only has meaning against the background of these hypotheses. Not only that, but other secondary causes have to be introduced (friction) in order to account for deviations from the norm. These secondary and supportive causes are likewise hypothetical and only have their meaning within the framework of the fundamental hypotheses.
Keeping to the terms of your metaphor, Michael, I would say that hypotheses have a dual role. On the one hand, they might be likened to catalysts, without which there would be no precipitate at all. They have this role when they are turned to the world of nature, producing what we call “facts”.
On the other hand, the hypothetical character of a hypothesis, its “if” character, exists only in mind. Again keeping to your metaphor, these hypotheses are dissolved in the “syntax” of the mind. (I am trying hard to slip under Michael’s dualism detector here.) It seems to me it only requires a “small” turnabout to see these hypotheses not simply as agents for the precipitation of facts, but more as what they truly are: bearers of that enveloping syntax. If only we knew how to parse the complex sentences of the language of science!
Robert Schmidt
